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For over seventy years American legal scholars have en-
gaged in intense debate concerning the proper methodology by
which to make choice of law decisions.1 Perhaps the debate has
been so intense because it represents a microcosm of the various
schools of jurisprudence. At their base, questions about choice of
law are really questions about the nature of law.2 Initially the
debate focused on the traditional orthodoxy, which was en-
shrined in the first Restatement of the Conflict of Laws. Meta-
physical in its outlook and rule-oriented in its content, the first
Restatement represented the quintessence of legal formalism.
Criticism of the Restatement began even before its completion,3
and increased after its publication in 1934.4 The criticism was
withering and eventually demonstrated that the traditional ap-
proach of the first Restatement was flawed beyond redemption.
Despite this condemnation, the traditional approach is still fol-
lowed in ten or twelve jurisdictions throughout the nation," and
as recently as 1995 several states reaffirmed their commitment
to the traditional approach.
6
One of the most perceptive critics of the traditional ap-
proach was Brainerd Currie, who not only took exception to the
L See Discussion of the Tentative Draft, Conflict of Laws, Restatement No, 1, 3 ALL
PRec. 222-231 (1925) (exchange concerning the first RESTATEMENT OF CoNucr OF LAws
between, on one hand, Joseph Beale and Austin Scott and, on the other hand, Walter
Wheeler Cook).
2. In fact, Chief Justice Stone once remarked that if he were planning a law school
curriculum he would regard conflict of laws as a course in place of jurisprudence. Paul
Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARV. L REV. 1210 (1946).
3. For example:
Yet even as the first Restatement was being written there came forward a
group of conflicts scholars who opposed Beale's views. The open break between
the two groups came in the 1920s, in the early stages of drafting the Restate-
ment. Some of the staff of advisers named by the Institute to aid Beale in
drafting the Restatement resigned after the first sections were written, and
they as well as others spoke out frequently against the Restatement approach
to the subject. Though the opponents differed among themselves as to details,
their rallying point was opposition to Bealian conceptualism
ROBERT LErr. Er AL, AmmcAN CoNuceS LAw 1 (4th ed. 1986).
4. See, ag., WALTER WHEELER CooK, TnE LoGIcAL AND LEGAL BASEs OF THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS (1942); ERNEST G. LORENZEN, Developments in the Conflict of Laws, in SELECTED
ARiTcLEs ON THE CoNFucT OF LAws 203-22 (1947).
5. Professor Symeonides lists ten states that follow the traditional approach in con-
tract cases and twelve in tort cases. See Symeon Symeonides, Choice of Law in the
American Courts in 1995: A Year in Review, 44 AM. J. COmP. L 181, 197-98 (1996).
6. See CHAMBCO v. Urban Masonry Co., 659 A.2d 297 (id. 1995) and Jack v. En-
terprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Los Angeles, 899 P.2d 891 (Wyo. 1995).
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old orthodoxy, but also proposed a new construct to replace it. 7
Currie's methodology, which he referred to as "governmental in-
terest analysis," focuses upon the policies underlying rules of
law to determine the interest that each state has in having its
law chosen to govern a controversy. Where the traditional ap-
proach was metaphysical, interest analysis is teleological; that
is, it directs choice of law decisions in a functional manner to
further the reasons or purposes which underlie rules of law.
Where the traditional approach was rule-oriented, interest anal-
ysis is process-oriented; it recognizes that hard-and-fast rules
dissipate the essence of law. It is no exaggeration to say that in-
terest analysis, as developed by Currie and other scholars, has
revolutionized thinking about the choice of law process. It has
not been a completely successful revolution, however, and other
modern theories have been proposed as alternatives to interest
analysis.
While Currie was developing his theories about choice of
law, work was started on the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws. That work began in 1953, but it was not until 1971 that
the Restatement (Second) was finalized.8 The Restatement (Sec-
ond) is a lengthy work containing numerous rules and presump-
tions based on a multi-factored approach designed to choose the
law of the state that has the "most significant relationship" to a
matter. Engendered by compromise, the second Restatement has
something for everyone; it includes rules, factors, interest analy-
sis, and other choice of law principles, all directed to determin-
ing the place of the most significant relationship. Scholarly reac-
tion to the second Restatement has been extremely negative. Its
adoption in the courts was slow at first. Gradually, though, the
Restatement (Second) gained increasing favor with the judiciary.
By 1983, it had been adopted in thirteen states.9 Eleven years
later, no less than 20 states had adopted the second Restatement
to decide tort conflicts while 25 states had adopted it to decide
contract conflicts, making it by far the most popular choice of
law methodology with the courts.10 This is a disturbing trend be-
cause the second Restatement, like its predecessor, is fundamen-
tally flawed. What was said about the first Restatement of Con-
flict of Laws is equally true of the Restatement (Second) of
7. Much of Currie's work is collected in BRANED CuaE, SEECTED ESSAYS ON Tm
CONmeCT OF LAws (1963) [hereinafter SELCTED ESSAYS].
8. See Herma H. Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MMER
L REv. 521, 552-53 (1983).
9. Id. at 556.
10. Symeonides, supra note 5, at 198-99.
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Conflict of Laws: "The rules so evolved have not worked and
cannot be made to work.""
The many states that follow either the traditional approach
of the first Restatement or the most significant relationship test
of the second Restatement are making a serious mistake. As this
article will explain, interest analysis is the only true way to
bring sense to the choice of law process.
I. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH OF THE FIST RESTATEMENT
The first Restatement of the Conflict of Laws embodied the
traditional approach to conflict of laws. The traditional approach
flows from a territorial notion of state sovereignty. According to
that notion, a state has authority to regulate occurrences within
its borders, but absolutely no further; a state's power abruptly
terminates at its borders, where the correlative power of other
states begins. Hence territoriaism dictates the foremost maxim
of the traditional approach: events should be governed by the
law of the place in which they occur.
On its surface, this maxim seems logical enough, but deeper
reflection raises serious question about it. As an illustration,
consider a conflict of "laws" that arises when the Smith family
goes to visit the Greene family. While Mr. and Mrs. Smith allow
their children to play on their front lawn, Mr. and Mrs. Greene
have a strict rule against even setting foot on their lawn. In all
probability, everyone would agree that while the Smiths are vis-
iting at the Greene household, they should respect the Greene
rule against going on the lawn. The Smiths are visitors in
Greene territory and the Greenes ought be able to control the
use of their own property. Events should be governed by the law
of the place where they occur.
But suppose the rules were reversed, so that Mr. and Mrs.
Smith did not permit their children to play on the lawn, while
Mr. and Mrs. Greene did. At first blush, we might again think
that the Greene rule should apply. After all, it is the Greene's
lawn, and if they don't mind kids playing on it, why should any-
one else object? Events should be governed by the law of the
place where they occur. Further suppose, though, that Mr. and
Mrs. Smith prohibit their children from playing on the lawn be-
cause the Smith kids are allergic to grass and become violently
ill from too much contact with it. This, of course, sheds new
light on the matter, which makes us think that, after all, these
11. Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflicts of Laws, in
Selected Essays, supra note 7, at 180.
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are the children of Mr. and Mrs. Smith, and parents ought to be
able to supervise their own kids, especially when it comes to
protecting their health. The children should be subject to paren-
tal authority wherever they might be.
So, perhaps it is not correct that events should be governed
by the law of the place where they occur. After all, if we choose
to apply the Smith rule at the Greene household, it benefits the
Smiths by guarding their kids against illness. At the same time,
choosing the Smith rule causes no harm to the Greenes. While
the Greenes allow people to play on their lawn, they do not re-
quire it, they gain no advantage from it. So, choosing the Smith
rule benefits the Smiths while in no way impairing the Greenes.
The traditional approach, however, ignores all of this. Its fo-
cus is upon the location of events, and it directs no attention
whatsoever to the content of the laws that might be chosen in a
particular case. As a result, the traditional approach often
defeats the purposes that laws are meant to serve. The funda-
mental flaw of the traditional approach is that by turning its
eye in the wrong direction, it frustrates the very reasons for
which laws are adopted. By disregarding the content of law, the
traditional approach works at cross purposes to law.
Moreover, the traditional maxim that events should be gov-
erned by the law of the place where they occur is plagued by
other serious deficiencies. In the first place, events do not al-
ways occur within one place. A contract, for instance, may be
composed of an offer that was made in state A and an accept-
ance made in state B. A tort may consist of negligence that hap-
pened in state A causing injury in state B. Indeed, choice of law
problems arise precisely because relevant events have occurred
in two or more states. By definition, choice of law questions ex-
ist in the context of multi-state situations. This presents a great
dilemma for territorialism: If events are to be governed by the
law of the place where they occur, what law should be chosen
when the relevant events have occurred in two or more states?
The traditional approach attempted to resolve this dilemma
by designating certain occurrences as key events which demark
the location of the vesting of a right. Hence, the traditional ap-
proach is also referred to as the "vested rights approach" be-
cause only those rights which vest within a state are subject to
its laws. For example, tort rights were considered to vest at the
place of injury rather than the place of negligence, on the theory
that no cause of action arose until the injury occurred.Y Thus,
12. See, ag., Alabama Great Southern R .v. Carroll, 11 So. 803, 806 (AL 1892)
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section 377 of the first Restatement provided that "Except in the
case of harm from poison, when a person sustains bodily harm,
the place of wrong is the place where the harmful force takes ef-
fect upon the body."1 A note to section 377 proclaimed that the
place where the harmful force is set in motion "is quite immate-
rial." 14 The note further declared that if the person who is
harmed goes into yet another state and dies there, "the place
where this last event happens is also immaterial." No explana-
tion was offered as to why this "last event" should be immate-
rial. Nor, for that matter, was any explanation offered as to why
the place where the harmful force is set in motion should be
immaterial.
In contract cases under the traditional approach, the focus
was switched from the place of injury to the place of contracting.
Contract rights were considered to vest at the place where a
contract was made, which was defined in the first Restatement
as the place where "the principal event necessary to make a con-
tract occurs."' 6 Delving into more metaphysical detail, the Re-
statement further specified that for a formal contract, the princi-
pal event was delivery;' 7 whereas for an informal unilateral
contract, it was the performance of the offeree;18 and for an in-
formal bilateral contract, it was the promise of the offeree. 9 In
keeping with the overall tenor of the Restatement, no explana-
tion was offered for these rules.
Explanation was anathema to the first Restatement, in all
probability because none could be found for its myriad dogmatic
proclamations. While the Restatement had a certain formalistic
logic, its rules had no reason behind them. In a tort case, for in-
stance, given that both a harmful act and an injury are neces-
sary elements for a cause of action, there is no reason that one
rather than the other should be designated as the key event
that evokes state authority. A harmful act and injury are both
key events, and to select one over the other is arbitrary.20 In a
("Up to the time this train passed out of Alabama no irjury had resulted. For all that oc-
curred in Alabama, therefore, no cause of action whatever arose.")
13. American Law Institute, RESTATm&ENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 377(1) (1934).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at § 311.
17. Id. at § 312.
18. Id. at § 323.
19. Id. at § 325.
20. 'rhe decision to focus on the injury as the uniquely relevant occurrence seemed
arbitrary. Even granting the Restatements focus on territorial events, why choose this
event rather than another" LsA BnnmAYF, CONFuOT OF LAWS 25 (2d ed. 1995).
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contract case, offer, acceptance, delivery, and performance can
all be considered key events, and there is no reason to select one
instead of the other. Indeed, from a territorial perspective, when
pertinent events occur in two states, it would seem that either
of those states has territorial authority to apply its law to the
cause of action. In a multi-state situation, then, the traditional
approach offers no rational explanation for choosing one state's
law over another state's law.
Because of this, the traditional approach was riddled with
internal inconsistency. For example, in a tort case where negli-
gence in one state caused injury in another, the law of the place
of injury was to be chosen because "for all that occurred" in the
first state, "no cause of action whatever arose."21 But in a con-
tract case where the contract was made in one state but breach
occurred in another, the law of the place of contracting was to
be chosen, despite the fact that for all that occurred in the first
state, no cause of action arises until there is a breach. Internal
inconsistency like this was inherent to the traditional approach,
because that approach was constructed upon formalistic artifice
that had no basis in reason.
Another deficiency of the territorial maxim has to do with.
the fact that events are not always discrete phenomena that oc-
cur neatly in one place. Consider, for example, the situation in
Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co., where a Wisconsin wo-
man sued her husband for personal injuries sustained in an au-
tomobile accident in California.2 California, but not Wisconsin,
followed a rule of spousal immunity, which would have barred
recovery. Admittedly, the accident occurred in California, but
where does the spousal immunity "occur"-California or Wiscon-
sin? Or does it even make any sense to ask that question? Some
events, it seems, are not discrete phenomena that can be said to
"occur" within a particular geographic area.
The situation in Haumschild illustrates that it is tautologi-
cal to ask where an event occurs. The very act of naming the
event designates where it occurs. In Haumschild if the case is
characterized as sounding in tort and we ask where the tort oc-
curred, the obvious answer is California. By begging the ques-
tion that way, California law has been chosen. On the other
hand, if the case is characterized as a family law matter and we
ask where the marriage is domiciled, the obvious answer is Wis-
21. The quoted language is from Alabama Great Southern R.R. v. Carroll, supra
note 12, at 806.
22. 95 N.W.2d 814 (Wis. 1959).
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consin. By begging the question that way, Wisconsin law is
chosen.
Naming an event or focusing upon this or that aspect of it
is nonsensical. In Haumschild it makes just as much sense-or
just as much nonsense-to say "this is a domestic relations case
that should be governed by the law of the family's domicile" as
it does to say 'this is a tort case that should be governed by the
law of the place where the accident occurred." As Felix Cohen
would have put it, all of this is "transcendental nonsense."O
Haumschild has elements of both tort and domestic relations,
and can be characterized as one just as readily as the other.
The traditional approach, then was nonsensical, tautologi-
cal, irrational, and non-purposive. Needless to say, this is some-
thing less than a winning combination.
II. ITREST ANALYSIS
A. Rational Interpretation
Interest analysis was created in direct response to the non-
purposive nature of the traditional approach. Interest analysis
is based upon two rather simple and related propositions. The
first is that choice of law decisions ought to be made in a way
that advances the purposes for which laws are made. The sec-
ond is that choice of law decisions should be made the same way
as any other legal decision. As Professor Kramer puts it, "choice
of law problems are problems of interpretation"2 In interpret-
ing a law, a court will determine the reason for which it was
adopted or the purpose which it serves. Laws-whether statu-
tory or common-are enacted for reasons, to accomplish pur-
poses. Interest analysis recognizes this and operates in a func-
tional, pragmatic mode designed to effectuate the purposes
which are served by laws. In the words of Professor Brilmayer,
"The undeniable appeal of governmental interest analysis is
that it sets out to implement the interests of states, rather than
to derive choice of law rules from abstract first principles oblivi-
ous to the purposes of substantive legal norms.&" As a result,
23. See Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLuAM L. lv. 809 (1935).
24. Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 CoLu I REv. 277, 283 (1990).
25. L BRILMAYEE, Com uoT oF LAws 169 (2d ed. 1995). Despite her recognition of
the "undeniable appeal" of interest analysis, Professor Brilmayer is a critic of it; see iU
at 76-115. In turn, her criticism of interest analysis has been subject to the charge that
it seriously misunderstands interest analysis. See Robert Sedler, Interest Analysis and
Forum Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A Response to the 'New Critics," 34 MEam L
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interest analysis brings rationality to choice of law decisions. It
is directed toward making legal decisions for reasons rather
than according to metaphysical dogma that has no relation to
the substantive policies which are served by the rules in ques-
tion and in fact usually has no relation to any policy
whatsoever.
B. False Conflicts
One of the greatest values of interest analysis is its ability
to reveal "false conflicts." A false conflict is a multi-state case in
which only one state has an interest in having its law chusen.
The classic example of a false conflict occurred in Alabama
Great Southern Railroad Company v. Carroll,26 an 1892 Ala-
bama decision involving an employee of the defendant railroad
who was injured through the negligence of a fellow employee.
The plaintiff was a citizen of Alabama and the defendant a cor-
poration of that state, which also was where the negligent act
occurred when the fellow employee failed to properly inspect a
train that had a defective link between two cars. The injury,
though, did not occur until the train reached its destination in
Mississippi. That state still followed the old common law rule,
according to which an employer bore no liability for injury
caused to a servant by the negligent act of a fellow servant. On
the other hand, Alabama had enacted an employers' liability act
which did recognize the responsibility of an employer for the
acts of its employees within the scope of employment duties. In
an opinion dripping with metaphysical territorialism, the Su-
preme Court of Alabama chose to follow the Mississippi rule on
the ground that "for all that occurred in Alabama," no cause of
action arose there.27 As the court saw it, the cause of action
arose in Mississippi, because that is where the injury tran-
spired, and the injury, to this formalistic way of thinking, is
"the fact which created the right to sue."2s
A cynic might point out that negligence, which of course in
Carroll occurred in Alabama, also is necessary to create the
REV. 593, 606-610 (1983) [hereinafter Sedler I]; Robert A. Sedler, Interest Analysis as the
Preferred Approach: A Response to Professor Brilmayer's 'Foundational Attack," 46 Omo
ST. L.J. 483 (1985); Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law: Interest Analysis and Its ?Jew Crits,"
36 A.x J. Comp. L. 681, 684-90 (1989) [hereinafter Posnak I]; Bruce Posnak, Choice of
Law-Interest Analysis: They Still Don't Get It, 40 WAYNE L. REv. 1121, 1131-51 (1994)
[hereinafter Posnak Il].
26. 11 So. 803 (Alab. 1982).




right to sue. Indeed, a cynic might add that, territorially speak-
ing, the case was decidedly more connected to Alabama than
Mississippi. In addition to the negligence having occurred in Al-
abama, the plaintiff and fellow servant were citizens of Alabama
and the defendant was an Alabama corporation.29 The employ-
ment relationship was centered in Alabama, and the train began
its fateful journey in Alabama.-1° Certainly, the Alabama connec-
tions predominate over the Mississippi ones.
More importantly, though, the territorial lens of the court in
Carroll completely overlooks the content of both the Alabama
statute and the Mississippi common law rule. Consideration of
their content reveals that the purpose of the Alabama statute is
to provide compensation from an employer for an employee who
has been injured by the negligence of a co-worker. The legisla-
ture of that state has decided that an employer should be liable
to compensate its employee for his or her injuries. Given that
the injured employee here is an Alabama citizen, that state has
an interest in having its law applied to the case at hand. In-
deed, this is exactly the situation that the law was meant to
cover: injury to a citizen of Alabama.
The Mississippi rule, on the other hand, is based upon a dif-
ferent policy. Mississippi's rule protects employers from what
that state considers to be unfair liability. As Mississippi sees it,
the negligence here is that of the fellow servant and not of the
master, therefore the latter should bear no liability. While that
is the policy of Mississippi, that state has no interest in having
its law applied here to protect an Alabama employer. Mississippi
has no interest in regulating the employment relationship be-
tween an Alabama employer and an Alabama employee. Missis-
sippi has no interest in protecting an Alabama corporation from
liability that the corporation's own state would impose upon the
corporation. It would be, as the saying goes, "unduly officious"
for Mississippi to want its law to be followed in the Carroll case.
Thus, Carroll presents the classic false conflict. Only one state
in Carroll has an interest. Choosing Alabama law in Carroll ad-
vances the interests of that state without in any way impairing
the interests of Mississippi.
It is worth pausing to reflect upon the meaning of the
phrase "false conflict." It denotes that although a case may have
a territorial connection to two or more states which have laws
that conflict with one another, there is no real conflict 3 in the
29. Id. at 803.
30. Id. at 803-804.
31. Professor Singer deserves credit for directing attention to the apt phrase "real
[Vol. 45338
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case, because only one state has an interest in having its law
chosen to govern the matter. Hence what appears under the
traditional approach to be a conflict, is revealed not to be so.
The conflict is false. It resolves itself perfectly. There is no real
conflict.
C. True Conflicts
Unfortunately, not every conflict of law is a false one that
can be resolved so neatly. True conflicts, where two or more
states have an interest in having their law chosen, do exist and
are more problematic. In fact, some debate still exists as to how
true conflicts should be resolved. Professor Currie's view was
that in the face of a true conflict, a court had no option but to
choose the law of its own state; that is, choose the law of the fo-
rum. In some cases, he thought that re-examination of a conflict
might show that it was only an "apparent conflict" that could,
after all, be resolved satisfactorily. But when a true conflict was
present, Currie thought that a court had no other recourse than
to choose forum law.
Critics of interest analysis were quick to seize upon this as
revelation that interest analysis was fundamentally flawed.
There is no rational way to resolve a true conflict, they said, so
the methodology must be deficient. This criticism proves too
much. To identify true conflicts but not be able to resolve them
perfectly is not so much a manifestation that the method is
faulty as it a realization that the world is not perfect and there
are some conflicts out there for which there is no perfect resolu-
tion. Given that our world is geographically and politically sub-
divided into numerous nations and states and given that numer-
ous transactions occur across borders, it is inevitable that some
conflicts of law will arise for which there are no perfect solu-
tions. In some situations that have multi-state connections,
there simply is no way to resolve the resulting conflict in a way
that accommodates the interests of all of the concerned states.
Interest analysis should be given credit for revealing the
true nature of conflicts of law. It reveals that some conflicts of
law are false and can be resolved in a manner that accommo-
dates the interests of all concerned states. And it reveals that
other conflicts of law are true and cannot be resolved so per-
fectly. In contrast, under the traditional approach, every conflict
of law was a "true" conflict. Based as it was upon the notion of
conflict See Joseph Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L REv. 1 (1989); Facing Real Con-
flicts, 24 CoPRTELL IT'L L.J. 197 (1991).
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territoriality, the traditional approach viewed every case that
had multiple territorial connections as presenting a true (terri-
torial) conflict. In the bargain, the traditional approach offered
no rational way to resolve those true conflicts. Interest analysis,
on the other hand, shows that not all territorial conflicts are, in
fact, true. In some instances, despite a territorial clash, there is
no clash of state interests; these cases are false conflicts that
can be happily resolved. Admittedly, there are other sorts of
conflicts that turn out, under the lens of interest analysis, to be
true. The cause of that, however, should be attributed to the
fact that the world is not politically or legally unified and
should not be taken as any deficiency of interest analysis. If
anything, interest analysis ought be credited for revealing which
conflicts are true and which are false.
Be that as it may, the question remains as to how a true
conflict should be resolved. Professor Currie took the position
that true conflicts should be decided by choosing the law of the
forum. 32 Although admitting that courts balance competing in-
terests in other circumstances, Currie concluded that courts
should not do so when confronted with two or more interested
states that have conflicting policiesS3 As Currie saw it, in the
face of a true conflict there was no reason for a court to choose
the law of the other state and by choosing its own law at least
the court would be advancing its own state policy.34
Critics of interest analysis as well as a number of its advo-
cates found this method of deciding true conflicts to be less than
satisfactory. One advocate noted that Currie's approach to the
true conflict suffered from the same failing that Currie himself
once ascribed to the traditional approach: it will "casually defeat
now the one and now the other policy, depending upon a purely
fortuitous circumstance."5 Whereas the fortuitous circumstance
32. SELECM ESSAYS, supra note 7, at 183-84.
33. Id. at 182-83.
34. Id. at 119. See also the opinion of the Supreme Court of Oregon in Lilienthal v.
Kaufman, 395 P.2d 543 (Ore. 1964):
We have, then, two jurisdictions, each with several close connections with the
transaction, and each with a substantial interest, which will be served or
thwarted, depending upon which law is applied. The interests of neither juris-
diction are dearly more important than those of the other. We are of the opin-
ion that in such a case the public policy of Oregon should prevail and the law
of Oregon should be applied .... Courts are instruments of state policy.
Id. at 549.
35. William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1, 19
(1963) (quoting Brainerd Currie, Married Women's Conflicts: A Study in Conflicts-of-
Laws Method, 25 U. Cm L. REv. 227, 262 (1958)).
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under the traditional approach was where some event occurred
territorially, under the Currie approach the fortuitous event is
where suit is filed. The latter encourages forum shopping and
causes the outcome of cases to turn upon where suit is filed,
both of which, needless to say, are consequences that are best
avoided.
Therefore, the search continues for a better way to resolve
true conflicts. And, in fact, further refinements made to interest
analysis show that some-although perhaps not many-true
conflicts are capable of being resolved in a relatively rational
manner without automatically choosing the law of the forum. As
we shall see, the development of the concepts of "apparent con-
flicts" and "comparative impairment" can bring sensibility to the
resolution of some true conflicts. As we also shall see, perhaps
some-although again not many-true conflicts can be decided
sensibly by choosing the "better rule of law."
D. Apparent Conflicts
Professor Currie did allow that there were some true con-
flicts that could be resolved in a more rational manner. He sug-
gested that upon re-examination, with "a more moderate and re-
strained interpretation" of state policy, some conflicts which at
first were thought to be true turn out not to be so. There were
"apparent" conflicts that, upon closer examination, are not so
conflictual as was originally thought and which can be ration-
ally resolved. People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria38 is a good exam-
ple of an apparent conflict.37 There, the state of California insti-
tuted an action under a state statute to forfeit a car that had
been used to illegally transport narcotics within the state. The
car had been purchased in Texas, where it was subject to an un-
paid mortgage, which prohibited the mortgagor from removing
the car from that state. Upon initial consideration, the case ap-
pears to present a true conflict. California would seem to have
an interest in enforcing its narcotics laws in any case where
narcotics had been transported within the state. Texas, on the
36. 311 P.2d 480 (Cal. 1957).
37. Conflict of law casebooks often include Bernkrant v. Fowler, 360 P.2d 906 (1961),
as the leading example of the use of the concept of apparent conflict. In my opinion,
Bernkrant is an example of the use of the concept, but not a very good example. As I see
it, in Bernkrant the court incorrectly manipulated state policy to achieve a result that
pretends to be reasonable but really is not, whereas in Ford Victoria the court correctly
analyzed state policy to reach a result that is genuinely reasonable. I would suggest,
then, that Ford Victoria, rather than Bernkrant, should be considered the leading exam-
ple of the use of the apparent conflict concept.
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other hand, would seem to have an interest in protecting a
Texas mortgagee from what that state considers to be unfair lia-
bility. Upon further examination, though, the court thought that
California's interest in having its law chosen was more apparent
than real. The California Supreme Court noted that the Califor-
nia forfeiture statute did not contemplate the forfeiture of the
interest of an innocent mortgagee.- To be innocent, a mortgagee
must make a "reasonable investigation" of the background of the
mortgagor. In One 1953 Ford Victoria, the Texas mortgagee had
not made such an investigation, there being no requirement to
do so under the law of Texas, which was where the mortgage
was made. The court pointed out that it would be unreasonable
to expect a Texas mortgagee to become familiar with the laws of
all the jurisdictions where a car could possibly be taken. 39
Therefore, the Texas mortgagee should be considered innocent.
The forfeiture statute did not expressly apply to mortgages
made in other states, and in the absence of an express legisla-
tive directive, the court did not think that it would advance the
interests of California to forfeit the rights of a Texas mortgagee
who was "innocent" under the laws of Texas. Thus, by giving a
restrained and moderate interpretation to the California statute,
the court concluded that this conflict was apparent only and
could be resolved in a rational way. In other words, the court
simply interpreted the California statute in a reasonable way,
and thereby was able to resolve an apparent conflict in a way
that advanced the interests of Texas while hardly impairing the
interests of California.
One 1953 Ford Victoria is an instance where the apparent
conflict concept works well to produce a rational resolution of a
multi-state case that at first appeared to present a true conflict.
The court's decision brought reasonableness to the law; the
court was correct to conclude that it would be unreasonable to
apply a California statute to forfeit the rights of a Texas mort-
gagee who did nothing wrong under Texas law and could be not
be expected to foresee that he might be subject to California law.
Moreover, the court's decision fits in nicely with the California
statute, which recognizes the rights of innocent mortgagees.
While not ignoring California policy, the California court, acting
altruistically rather than provincially, gives it a moderate and
restrained interpretation. Hence, the apparent conflict concept
works well in this case.
38. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 311 P.2d at 481.
39. Id. at 482.
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Moreover, the court's opinion illustrates that, when used in
a moderate and restrained manner, interest analysis is capable
of recognizing party expectations. Particularly in contract and
similar cases where parties do have genuine expectations, they
can be taken into account in analyzing a state's interest. In fact,
in those tort cases where genuine expectations exist, interest
analysis is completely capable of taking them into account, as
was done in a 1993 New York decision, Cooney v. Osgood Ma-
chinery, Inc.40 This is another advantage that a moderate and
restrained approach brings to interest analysis.
Still, even upon re-examination with a more moderate and
restrained eye, a high majority of true conflicts turn out to be
true rather than merely apparent. As a result, the apparent
conflict concept brings rationality to the resolution of only a
small percentage of cases.
E. Comparative Impairment
Further refinement of the apparent conflict concept led to
the development of a method to rationally resolve true conflicts
by comparing the impairment of state interests. The concept of
comparative impairment was first articulated by Professor Bax-
ter in 1963,41 and since then has been advocated by a number of
scholars 2 and utilized by several courts as a means to rationally
decide true conflicts.43 The comparative impairment concept does
not operate by weighing conflicting state policies to decide which
is better or more important. Rather, it functions by assuming
that each state's policy is of equal weight and seeks to evaluate
the relative impairment to each state's interest if its law is not
chosen. Accordingly, a true conflict will be resolved by following
the law of the state whose interest would suffer the greater im-
pairment if its law is not chosen.
40. 612 N.E.2d 277 (1993).
41. Baxter, supra note 35.
42. See, ag., Harold W. Horowitz, The Law of Choice in California-A Restatement,
21 U.CLA L REV. 719 (1974); Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 CoLuM. L.
REV. 277, 315-18, 323-24 (1990). But see, eg., Leo Kanowitz, Comparative Impairment
and Better Law: Grand Illusions in the Conflict of Laws, 30 HAS'mGs L.J. 255 (1978);
Herma H. Kay, The Use of Comparative Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An Evalu-
ation of the California Experience, 68 CALIF. L REv. 577 (1980).
43. E.g., Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied 429 US.
859 (1976); Lettieri v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 627 F.2d 14
(9th Cir. 1980); Biscoe v. Arlington County, 738 F.2d 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Paulo v.
Bepex Corp., 792 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1986).
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In 1976, the Supreme Court of California gained the distinc-
tion of being the first court to adopt the comparative impair-
ment concept when it decided Bernhard v. Harrah's Club." In
that case, the court did an excellent job of describing how the
comparative impairment concept operated, especially in explain-
ing that the concept attempts to accommodate conflicting state
policies by focusing on their reach rather than weighing the
worthiness of state policies. There has been some debate, how-
ever, about how well the court did in actually applying the com-
parative impairment concept.45 In its next encounter with com-
parative impairment, Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil
Co.,46 the California Supreme Court misused comparative im-
pairment egregiously, perverting it into a "better rule of law"
approach,47 which functions exactly in the manner that the court
said comparative impairment is not supposed to function, that
is, by weighing policies to determine which is better.
The concept of comparative impairment has had a happier
experience in other courts. A case that illustrates how well the
comparative impairment concept can operate to rationally re-
solve a true conflict is Lettieri v. Equitable Life Assurance Soci-
ety of the United States.48 In Lettieri, the defendant insurance
company refused to pay the proceeds of a life insurance policy
on the ground that the insured had made false statements about
his health on the application for the policy. While admitting that
the application contained false statements, the beneficiaries of
the policy claimed that the falsehoods were due to negligence of
the defendant's agent rather than misrepresentations made by
the insured. Under the law of New York, the home state of the
defendant, a false statement on an insurance application is con-
clusively presumed to be a material misrepresentation which
gives the insurer an absolute right to rescind the policy. Accord-
ing to the law of California, the home state of the plaintiffs, a
false statement on an application for insurance may amount to
a material misrepresentation that voids the policy, but there is
no conclusive presumption to that effect. If a falsehood can be
44. 546 P.2d 719 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976).
45. See RUSSELL WEINTRAuB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFUCT OF LAWS 338 (3d ed.
1986).
46. 583 P.2d 721 (CaL 1978).
47. The better rule of law approach is described infra notes 57-59 and accompany-
ing teiL
48. 627 E2d 14 (9th Cir. 1980).
49. Id. at 932, n.4.
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plausibly explained, the policy will remain in effect; otherwise it
is void.
The situation in Lettieri appears to present a true conflict.
New York has an interest in protecting a resident insurance
company from fraudulent claims. 50 California has an interest in
protecting its citizens from wrongful denials of their insurance
claims.51 This conflict, though, can be rationally resolved by
comparing the impairment of each state's interest. As the court
noted, if California law is chosen, the New York insurer still re-
ceives some protection against fraud.52 California law does not
grant the insurer an absolute right to rescind the policy, but it
does allow the insurer to rescind the policy if there is no plausi-
ble explanation for the falsehood. Under California law, the
presence of a false statement on an insurance application does
not operate as a conclusive presumption of wrongdoing, but it
certainly operates as a rebuttable presumption of wrongdoing.
In the words of the court, "The effect of the California rule will
be to protect the legitimate claims of local beneficiaries while
permitting the insurer to prevail if the decedent's conduct was
as culpable as the paper record on its face tends to prove."
53
On the other hand, f New York law were chosen, the inter-
ests of California would be completely foreclosed. Under New
York law, the policy would be automatically rescinded and the
beneficiaries of the policy would have no opportunity whatsoever
to show that their claim might be legitimate."4 Clearly, Califor-
nia is the state whose interests would be the most impaired if
its law is not chosen.
Lettieri demonstrates that the comparative impairment con-
cept can bring rationality to the resolution of some true con-
flicts. Unfortunately, in several early cases55 the courts have
misused the concept and thereby given it a negative reputation
that it does not deserve.56 Any concept can be misused, and
these decisions should not be taken as indicative of some flaw in
the concept of comparative impairment itself. As Lettieri and
other cases show, the concept of comparative impairment can
provide a sensible solution to some true conflicts. There is, how-





55. See Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 583 P.2d 721 (Cal. 1978); Cable v.
Sahara Tahoe Corp., 155 Cal. Rptr. 770 (2d Dist. 1979).
56. See Kanowitz, supra note 42; Kay, supra note 42.
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ever, a more accurate criticism of comparative impairment,
namely that it has a limited utility. This is so because in most
instances of true conflict each state's interest will be equally im-
paired if its law is not chosen. The comparative impairment con-
cept is a good idea when it works, but unfortunately there are
many occasions when it is futile because the impairment to each
state's policy if its law is not chosen will be roughly the same.
So, comparative impairment, like its progenitor, the apparent
conflict, only solves some portion of true conflicts. In most in-
stances of true conflict, then, the question remains of how they
can be resolved in a rational way.
F. The Better Rule of Law
Some scholars suggest that true conflicts should be resolved
by choosing the "better rule of law," and a number of courts
have opted for this approach. 7 The leading advocate of the bet-
ter rule of law approach is Professor Robert Leflar, who has de-
vised a list of criteria, one of which is the better rule of law,
which he proposes to decide all conflicts of law, not just true
conflicts.58 Other choice of law scholars, though, have main-
tained more prudently that the better rule of law factor should
be used-if at all--only in the case of true conflicts.5 9 If the bet-
ter rule of law approach is taken to mean that courts should
choose modern rules that represent the majority trend over
rules that are "anachronistic" or "aberrational," it can bring a
certain degree of rationality to the resolution of some true con-
flicts, but only in a limited number of cases. After all, there are
not that many rules which can be fairly dismissed as anachro-
nistic or aberrational, and otherwise there is no valid criteria by
which to claim that one rule is "better" than another. Not sur-
prisingly, the courts have shown a strong proclivity to proclaim
that their own state's rule is the better one, which has led to
the rebuke that the better rule of law approach is unduly pro-
vincial. In fact, as instruments of their own state policy, courts
should be inclined to view their law as better, even when it is
old-fashioned or a departure from the norm. So, the better rule
57. See Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205 (N.H. 1966); Conklin v. Homer, 157 N.W.2d 579
(Wis. 1968); Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968); lilkovich v. Saari, 203
N.W.2d 408 (Minn. 1973).
58. See Robert Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.
L REv. 267 (1966); Robert Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considera-
tions, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1584, 1585-88 (1966).




of law approach is undeniably chauvinistic. Nonetheless, it of-
fers a relatively sensible way of resolving a limited number of
true conflicts.
However, like the concepts of apparent conflict and compar-
ative impairment, the better rule of law approach does not pro-
vide a completely satisfactory method for resolving all true con-
flicts, in all probability because no such method is possible. True
conflicts, after all, exist where two or more states have a genu-
ine interest in having their law chosen. Often, there simply is
no perfect way to resolve that sort of clash. The concepts of ap-
parent conflicts and of comparative impairment offer a rational
way to resolve some, but certainly not all, true conflicts. And, in
a few cases of true conflict, the better rule of law approach may
be helpful. Otherwise, though, true conflicts remain that cannot
be perfectly resolved.
Perhaps there never will be a completely satisfactory
method for resolving all true conflicts. If not, this should not be
taken as an inadequacy of interest analysis. True conflicts exist
because human activity transpires across the borders of sepa-
rate states and nations that have varying laws. No choice of law
methodology can change that situation or provide perfect solu-
tions to every conflict of law. Interest analysis at least provides
rationality to most choice of law decisions. Perhaps that is the
most that can be asked.
G. Unprovided-For Cases
If the true conflict was grist for the mill of criticism of inter-
est analysis, the so-called "unprovided-for case" was the smoking
gun that demonstrated the total breakdown of interest analy-
sis.60 An unprovided-for case is one in which no state has an in-
terest in having its law chosen. It may seem to be an anomaly
that a situation could exist in which no state has an interest in
having its law chosen. But apparently such anomalies do exist.
Apparently.
The classic unprovided-for situation arises where a citizen
of state A is injured in an automobile accident while riding as a
guest in the car of a citizen of state B. State A has a guest stat-
ute precluding recovery, while state B has no guest statute and
60. Given the unprovided-for case, T91he entire structure of interest analysis crum-
bled .... The emperor indeed stands naked for all to see." Aaron Twerski, Neumeier v.
Kuehner: Where Are the Emperor's Clothes?, 1 HoFsrRA L REV. 104, 108 (1973); see also,
John Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 wh. & MARY
L REV. 173, 200-207 (1981).
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hence allows recovery. State As guest statute is meant to immu-
nize hosts from ungrateful guests, but state A has no interest in
immunizing a state B host whose own state thinks that he or
she is undeserving of immunity.61 On the other hand, state B's
rule is meant to provide compensation for injured parties, but
state B has no interest in compensating a state A guest whose
own state believes that he or she should not be compensated.
Apparently, no state has an interest in having its law chosen.
This anomaly, however, is more apparent than real, or, to
use the words of Professor Kramer, it is more mythical than
real.62 The anomaly arises by overlooking the fact that while
state A may have a guest statute, it also has a statute or com-
mon law rule that provides a right of recovery for a person who
has been injured through the negligence of another person.63
While state A has no interest in applying it guest statute to im-
munize a state B host from liability, state A does have an inter-
est in applying its cause of action to allow a state A citizen who
has been injured to recover damages. The plaintiff has a claim
under the law of state A, and that state has an interest in hav-
ing its cause of action followed in this case."' Thus, a more com-
plete analysis of state A law shows that this situation presents
a false conflict rather than an unprovided-for case.
Professor Kramer also describes another kind of case that
seems to be unprovided-for, not because law is overlooked but
rather because it is misconceived. Erwin v. Thomas is the lead-
ing example. There, a Washington wife sued her husband's Ore-
gon employer for loss of consortium caused by an accident that
injured the husband in the course of his employment. Oregon
recognized such an action for loss of consortium, while Washing-
ton did not. Upon initial analysis, the case appears to present
an unprovided-for situation. Oregon's policy favors compensation
for spouses who suffered loss of consortium, but Oregon has no
interest in compensating a Washington spouse whose own state
does not believe she should be compensated. Washington policy
favors protecting employers from this sort of liability, but Wash-
ington has no interest in protecting an Oregon employer whose
61. Or, state A's guest statute may be meant to reduce insurance rates by preclud-
ing guests and hosts from colluding to defraud insurance companies. Still, state A would
have no interest in a case where the car in question is garaged in state B, because in-
surance rates are set according to where a car is garaged. Thus, state A's rates would
not be affected by holding the state B defendant liable.
62. Larry Kramer, The Myth of the "Unprovided-For" Case, 75 VA. L REv. 1045
(1989).
63. Id. at 1056-60.
64. Id. at 1059-60.
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own state thinks he should be liable. Apparently, neither state
has an interest in having its law chosen.
To put it that way, however, misconceives why the plain-
tiff's claim should fail. As Professor Kramer explains, the plain-
tiff's claim fails "because she is not deemed to have suffered any
injury." 5 The plaintiff has no cause of action under Washington
law because Washington does not extend its cause of action to a
citizen from Oregon, and the plaintiff has no cause of action
under Oregon law because that state does not recognize this
sort of injury.6 "The plaintiff thus has no right to recover under
either Oregon law or Washington law, and her complaint should
be dismissed"7 not because it is unprovided-for, but simply be-
cause the plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief may
be granted.
There are, then, two varieties of apparently unprovided-for
cases, neither of which turns out to be truly unprovided-for
when analyzed more thoroughly. Professor Kramer has demon-
strated, quite convincingly that there is no anomaly here, be-
cause there is no such thing as an unprovided-for case.
H. Statutory Construction and Common Law Analysis
Despite the fact that interest analysis brings nothing more
than the standard method of modern legal interpretation to
choice of law, its mode of operation frequently has been misun-
derstood. One misunderstanding of interest analysis has led to
the accusation that it is a "well-intentioned misrepresentation."6
This accusation portrays interest analysis as a pretense that
purports to make choice of law decisions according to legislative
intent, when, in fact, legislative intent often is nonexistent or
mythical. 69 This criticism seriously misunderstands interest
analysis as well as the process of legal interpretation in gen-
eral.70 It is correct that in interpreting statutes to make any le-
gal decision, legislative intent often is fictional. But interest
analysis, like any other question of interpretation, is not a
search for legislative intent. In describing interest analysis, Pro-
fessor Currie explained that it "is the method of statutory con-
65. Id. at 1062.
66. Id. at 1062-63.
67. Id.
68. Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICiL L
REv. 392 (1980).
69. Id. at 399-407, 424-31.
70. See Sedler, supra note 25; Posnak I, supra note 25.
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struction, and of interpretation of common-law rules.&" 71 That is,
when a court is faced with a choice between two rules, it should
resolve the choice by interpreting the rules according to the
principles of statutory construction or common law analysis. In
construing a statutory rule, a court certainly may consider the
intent of the legislature in enacting the statute, although often
that source will not be very helpful to determine the purpose of
a statute. Attempting to ascertain legislative intent has never
been a particularly effective means of statutory interpretation,
whether to make a choice of law decision or any other legal deci-
sion. In many instances, legislative intent will not yield a defini-
tive answer to the question at hand, and judges will have to de-
cide for themselves what purposes are served by the law in
question. Thus, statutory interpretation is often similar to inter-
preting and applying the common law.72 Indeed, the essence of
statutory construction and common law analysis involves the
same process of interpretation. In this respect, we see again
that a choice of law problem, like all other legal problems, is a
problem of interpretation.
Insofar as the process of interpretation is concerned, the
concept of "legislative intent" refers to lawmakers and not solely
to the legislature. Judges as well as legislators make law. The
vast body of common law was made by judges. So, the concept of
"legislative," is best understood as referring to law, whether
made by the judiciary or the legislature.7 3
If "intent" is taken to refer to the actual state of mind of a
lawmaker, it often is impossible to ascertain what that intent
may be. More often than not, legislative intent is a mythical
thing that has no real existence. Thus, it is more accurate, and
certainly more fruitful, to speak of legislative "purpose" What is
the purpose that underlies a law? What purpose is meant to be
served by a law?
The purposes or policies expressed by some laws are readily
apparent, even when not expressly stated. It cannot be said, for
example, that the policy which underlies a worker's compensa-
tion law such as the one in the Carroll case is to provide com-
71. BaaNEAP CURmE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON TEE CoNFLIrr OF LAWS 627 (1963).
72. See Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L REv. 863 (1930); William R.
Bishin, The Law Finders: An Essay in Statutory Interpretation, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 1
(1965).
73. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once stated, '[Iln substance the growth of the
law is legislative .... It is legislative in its grounds .... Every important principle
which is developed by litigation is in fact and at bottom the result of more or less defi-




pensation for injured workers from their employers. That policy
is apparent in the law itself and does not need to be explicitly
stated. In other instances, however, the purposes that underlie
laws are not so readily apparent. Whether dealing with statu-
tory rules or common law rules, judges often have to decide for
themselves what purposes are served by the rules in question.
That is what judges do. And that is what brings reason to the
law. At times in that process, judges will make decisions about
which there is disagreement, perhaps even considerable disa-
greement. That is so about any legal methodology; there always
will be some disagreement about the decisions that judges
make. Interest analysis, however, has the great advantage of
providing reason to the law. Without it, choice of law is non-pur-
posive and desultory. 74
In accordance with conventional legal interpretation, inter-
est analysis is directed to determining the purposes or policies
that are embodied in a statute or common law rule.75 Admit-
tedly, this gives judges a certain degree of discretion, but no
more so than they possess in deciding any other question of in-
terpretation. Judicial discretion is endemic to the legal process.
Decision-making necessarily entails the exercise of discretion,
and in that respect a choice of law decision is no different from
any other legal decision.
That is not to say there are not limits upon the policy deter-
minations made by judges in their choice of law decisions. Once
a court determines that a common law rule embodies a particu-
lar policy, that decision becomes precedent, which must be fol-
lowed until overruled and which, of course, is binding on lower
courts. Insofar as statutes are concerned, when the legislature
enacts a particular policy, it is binding upon the courts. Admit-
tedly, there are times when judges stretch their discretion too
far by nullifying policy choices made by the legislature. An ex-
ample of this sort of abuse of judicial discretion can be seen in
74. As Prof Weintraub stated:
I now return to the first premise of interest analysis: that legal rules have pur-
poses that can be identified. There is nothing new or remarkable about that.
The most important lesson taught in the first year of law school is that an in-
telligent decision to apply or not to apply a legal rule depends upon knowing
the reasons for the rule. This does not mean that it is always easy to articulate
the reasons for a rule or that there is not often disagreement over these rea-
sons, it just means that a decision, flawed though it may be, should be made
concerning the purposes before a rule is applied.
RussELL J. WEnTRAUB, Interest Analysis in the Conflict of Laws as an Application of
Sound Legal Reasoning, 35 MERCER L REv. 629, 631 (1984).
75. See Sedler, supra note 25, at 609.
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the dissenting opinion in Lilienthal v. Kaufman, an Oregon case
in which a California creditor sued an Oregon debtor on two
promissory notes made in California.76 The Supreme Court of
Oregon chose to follow an Oregon rule of immunity for spend-
thrifts which defeated the plaintiff's claim.7 7 California had no
spendthrift defense, and had its law been chosen the plaintiff
would have prevailed. The situation in Lilienthal is truly per-
plexing because it presents a real conflict wherein both states
have an interest in having their law chosen to govern the case.
Oregon has an interest in protecting an Oregon spendthrift and
his family from financial ruin, while California has an interest
in securing the contract rights of a California creditor. A major-
ity of the Oregon high court felt that because the interests of
neither state could be said to be more important than the other,
the Oregon court, as an instrument of state policy, had no alter-
native but to choose Oregon law.78 One member of the court,
Justice Goodwin, dissented from that position, arguing that Cal-
ifornia law should be chosen and the contract enforced. 79 There
is something odd about Justice Goodwin's position in that it
would allow a right of recovery to an out-of-state creditor that
could not be provided to an in-state creditor. Justice Goodwin
was willing to do that, however, because he thought that both
states have a policy "in favor of enforcing contracts, [which] has
been lost sight of in favor of a questionable policy in Oregon
which gives special privileges to the rare spendthrift... "80
While it may be debatable exactly how the conflict in Lilien-
thal should be decided, Justice Goodwin's position is misguided
because it skews the policy of his own state. Yes, both states do
have a policy of enforcing contracts, but the legislature of Ore-
gon has further declared, in no uncertain terms, that there are
limits to that policy. The Oregon legislature has enacted a stat-
ute that expresses a countervailing policy favoring immunity for
spendthrifts. That policy may be "questionable" in the sense that
there are those who disagree with it, but there is no question
that it is the official policy of the State of Oregon. There simply
is no getting around the fact that policy has been enacted in
statutory form, and as such is binding upon Oregon judges.
When a statute is applied, whether in a multi-state situation or
76. Lilienthal v. Kaufinan, 395 P.2d 543, 550-53 (Or. 1964) (Goodwin, J. dissenting).
77. Id. at 545-49.
78. Id. at 549.
79. Id. at 550-53 (Goodwin, J., dissenting). Justice Sloan joined in Justice Goodwin's




one that is purely domestic, it strains the bounds of judicial dis-
cretion for a judge to deny duly enacted policy. Surely if Lilien-
thal had been an entirely domestic case, it would be improper
for a judge to limit the scope of the spendthrift statute on the
ground that the judge thought that its purpose was question-
able. And it is just as improper for a judge to take that stance
in a multi-state situation. Once the legislature has enacted a
statute, or once a higher court has adopted a common law rule,
it is the obligation of judges to respect the policy expressed in
the statute or rule. It improperly stretches judicial discretion for
a judge to nullify a law because he or she disagrees with its
purpose.
Certainly judges enjoy a good deal of discretion in interpret-
ing law, but there is, after all, a significant distinction between
interpreting a statute or rule and nullifying it. For instance, in
the previously discussed People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria,8l the
court was able to supplement or extend statutory policy in a di-
rection that was indicated by the statute itself. That is quite dif-
ferent from negating a statute. While the former is compatible
with declared statutory policy, the latter is antithetical to it.
This discussion is not meant to suggest that in the face of a
true conflict, a judge must always choose the law of his or her
own state. As discussed previously,8 2 in the instance of a true
conflict there may be circumstances which justify choosing the
law of a state other than the forum state. But this discussion is
meant to suggest, most assuredly, that in making any choice of
law decision a judge should not ignore or distort state policy.
Before conflicts of law are decided-indeed, before they are
shown to be true, apparent, or false-state interests need to be
analyzed, and it goes without saying that they should be ana-
lyzed fairly and accurately.
Even in determining the interests of states other than their
own, judges should not discard the policy decisions made by the
legislature or courts of those states. In Lilienthal, had suit been
filed in California, it would be just as inappropriate for a Cali-
fornia judge as an Oregon one to deny that Oregon had enacted
a policy of protecting spendthrifts. If Oregon or any other state
enacts a spendthrift statute, that statute represents the official
policy of the state and should not be gainsaid by judges of any
state.
81. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 34-59 and accompanying text.
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It is interesting to consider what the result might be in Lil-
ienthal according to the better rule of law approach. If the fo-
rum had been in California rather than Oregon, the court, after
noting the presence of a true conflict and if inclined toward the
better rule of law approach,8 likely would opt for California law
on the ground that the Oregon spendthrift defense was anachro-
nistic and, if not aberrational, certainly in the minority. This
would seem to be a plausible explanation to conclude that the
California rule was the better rule. But in the actual case, of
course, the forum was in Oregon, not California. Would it be
reasonable-indeed, would it be proper-for an Oregon court to
choose a California law over an Oregon one on the ground that
the California rule was better than the Oregon rule? Wouldn't
we expect the Oregon court to say something like the following:
There are those who say that our spendthrift defense is "anachronistic"
We prefer to see it as having withstood the test of time. The spendthrift
defense has been further denigrated as "aberrational." True, it is followed
by but a small minority of jurisdictions; but where is it written that the
majority is always right? While the spendthrift defense is not very popu-
lar outside of Oregon, law is not a popularity contest. Oregon is a state
that has a unique legal tradition, and proud of it. We have no hesitation
to be in a minority, even of one. After due consideration, our legislature
has determined that the spendthrift defense is the best policy for this
state. It would be remiss for an Oregon court, which after all is an in-
strument of state policy, to say that the policy of some other state is bet-
ter than the one embraced by our own legislature.
I. The Fate of Interest Analysis
Interest analysis revolutionized the choice of law process,
and brought it into the mainstream of legal interpretation. Its
impact has been tremendous; it truly has changed the way that
people think about choice of law. While interest analysis has
been endorsed or approved by a high majority of academics,8 its
83. Ordinarily the California courts are not inclined to follow the better rule of law
approach, and on a number of occasions have stated that choice of law decisions should
be made by determining the scope of state policy and not by weighing the merit of con-
flicting state policies. Nonetheless, as discussed above, on one occasion the California
Supreme Court misused the comparative impairment concept by converting it into the
better rule of law approach. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
84. See, e-g., Posnak 11, supra note 25; Posnak I, supra note 25; Herma H. Kay, A
Defense of Currie's Governmental Interest Analysis, 215 RCA.D.L 9 (1989); Herma H.
Kay, Testing the Modern Critics Against Moffatt Hancock's Choice of Law Theories, 73
Cm. L Rv. 525 (1985); Russell J. Weintraub, A Defense of Interest Analysis in the Con-
flict of Laws and the Use of that Analysis in Products Liability Cases, 46 Omo ST. L.J.
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reception in the courts has been more grudging. Professor
Borchers identifies four states-California, Hawaii, Massachu-
setts, and New Jersey-as having adopted pure interest analy-
sis. 5 Actually, New York, which Professor Borchers lists as an
"eclectic" state,88 was the first state whose courts adopted inter-
est analysis, but the evolution of interest analysis in New York
has not gone smoothly. In a series of cases involving guest stat-
utes, the New York Court of Appeals began to construct a logical
system based on interest analysis to make choice of law deci-
sions.87 Subsequently, however, the Court of Appeals spoiled its
earlier efforts by inexplicably reverting in guest statute cases to
a rule-oriented approach partially based on territoriality and di-
verging from interest analysis.8 8 More recently, the New York
court further muddied the waters by relying alternatively upon
its previous rules and interest analysis to make a choice of law
decision in a tort case.8 9 A short time later, the court added even
more to the confusion by ruling that in contract cases it would
follow the grouping of contacts approach.90 So now, the situation
in New York is nothing short of a "mess,"91 which could have
been avoided had the Court of Appeals only been more faithful
to interest analysis.
493 (1985); Weintraub, supra note 74; Sedler I, supra note 25; Robert A. Sedler, The
Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis and a Reformulation, 25
U.CJA. L REV. 181 (1977); David E. Seidelson, Interest Analysis: The Quest for Perfec-
tion and the Frailties of Man, 19 DuQ. L. REv. 207 (1981); Jeffrey M. Shaman, The
Choice of Law Process: Territorialism and Functionalism, 22 WBL & MARY L REV. 227
(1980); Harold W. Horowitz, The Law of Choice of Law in California-A Restatement, 21
U.C.LA. L. REv. 719 (1974); Baxter, supra note 35.
Professor Kramer notes that interest analysis "probably remains the dominant
choice of law theory among academics, but its hold is slipping." Kramer, supra note 24,
at 278. He also points out that some of the recent criticism of interest analysis is either
"flawed" or "misinterpret[s] what interest analysis assumes and how it works." Id. at
278-79.
85. Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49
WAS. & LEE L. REv. 357, 373, n.114 (1992). Professor Symeonides partially disagrees,
classifying Hawaii and Massachusetts as following a "combined modem approach," that
joins interest analysis and other methods. See Symeonides, supra note 5, at 202.
86. Borchers, supra note 85, at 372.
87. See Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963); Dym v. Gordon, 209 N.E.2d
792 (N.Y. 1965); Tooker v. Lopez, 249 N.E.2d 394 (N.Y. 1969).
88. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972).
89. Cooney v. Osgood Mach., Inc., 612 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1993).
90. In re Allstate Ins. (Stolarz), 613 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1993).
91. The word "mess" to describe the New York situation is found in RoGER CRAMTON
ET AL, CoNFLICTs op LAw (5th ed. 1993), supp. at 7 (an informal memorandum by Larry
Kramer entitled, Updating the Materials, June 28, 1994).
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In California, interest analysis has been adopted with much
more success. In fact, the California courts have been able to
consistently use interest analysis thoughtfully and sensibly,92
not to mention altruistically,93 except unfortunately with regard
to the concept of comparative impairment.94 The courts of other
states, also, have used interest analysis, and some have been
able to do so in a principled, intelligent way.95 Some courts adopt
a relatively pure version of interest analysis, while others are
more eclectic. In other respects, the transition to interest analy-
sis has been far from complete. A number of state courts have
rejected the new learning and decided to cling to the traditional
approach. In the meantime, the Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws has appeared on the scene, and has been adopted in a
growing number of states. As will be discussed shortly, interest
analysis is incorporated as one aspect of the second Restatement,
which encompasses a wide variety of measures. Certainly, inter-
est analysis has had a strong impact on the second Restatement,
but that tome also goes off in a number of directions having
nothing to do with interest analysis. Furthermore, in some in-
stances, the courts, when applying the second Restatement, em-
phasize interest analysis, but in other instances they de-
emphasize it, or ignore it altogether. So, the value of interest
analysis has yet to be nearly fully appreciated by the courts,
and the choice of law process becomes ever more muddled. 6
92. See Emery v. Emery, 289 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1955); People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria,
311 P.2d 480 (Cal. 1957); Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727 (Cal. 1967); Hurtado v. Super. Ct.
Sacramento County, 522 P.2d 666 (Cal. 1974); Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719
(Cal. 1976).
93. See One 1953 Ford Victoria, 311 P.2d at 598; Bernkrant v. Fowler, 360 P.2d 906
(Cal. 1961); Reich, 432 P.2d at 554-56.
94. See Kay, supra note 42 (concluding that, in four cases, the California courts
have misused the concept of comparative impairment).
95. A number of courts use interest analysis either as part of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) or as a conversion of it. See infra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
96. In 1953, William Prosser described the state of conflict of laws as follows: "[t]he
realm of the conflict of laws is a dismal swamp, filled with quaking quagmires, and in-
habited by learned but eccentric professors who theorize about mysterious matters in a
strange and incomprehensible jargon. The ordinary court, or lawyer, is quite lost when
engulfed and entangled in it:' William Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MicH. L. REv.
959, 971 (1953). Unfortunately, some 40 years later this description is still accurate.
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III. THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
A. The Nature of the Beast
The American Law Institute began work on the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws in 1953. In a sense, the second Re-
statement is misnamed, being as much a "pre-statement" as a
restatement of the law.97 Unlike the first Restatement, the Sec-
ond was intended to go beyond restating by providing guidance
for the future.9 Its evolution followed a rocky road, which took
over seventeen years to traverse. Along the way, the Restate-
ment (Second) went through a number of drafts that were
greeted with nothing short of scorn upon their dissemination.
Some of the criticism assailed the very conception of the second
Restatement. Professor Ehrenzweig, probably the most harsh
critic, castigated it in no uncertain terms:
The American Law Institute has made the long overdue concession that
its first attempt at restating unstatable law was a failure in its very con-
ception... But instead of abandoning an enterprise which has found
near-unanimous rejection among scholars, which has caused unending
confusion in the courts ... the Institute is about to produce a [second
Restatement]. Again, it seems, two generations of American scholars may
have to spend the better parts of their lives in proving to the profession
the futility and fatality of this effort.. 9
Along similar, though less severe lines, Professor Currie
said of the effort to produce a second Restatement that "A de-
scriptive restatement with any sort of internal consistency is im-
possible."10 Early drafts of the Restatement (Second) also were
assailed for ignoring contemporaneous choice of law theory,
most particularly interest analysis. That omission was rectified
in a later draft which added a new section incorporating interest
analysis, as part of the overall approach advanced by the second
Restatement. Still, when the Restatement (Second) was finally
completed in 1971, interest analysis remained only a part of its
overall scheme, and not the most important part at that. The
Restatement (Second) is a series of compromises, based upon
"vastly different conceptions about how a choice of law problem
97. "In many respects the Restatement became a Pre-statement." MAUicE ROSEN-
BERG ET AL, CoNFIcT oF LAws--CAsEs AND MATERuLs 511 (10th ed. 1996).
98. See Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L REv.
315 (1972).
99. ALBERT A. EHRENZWEiG, TREAT= ON TiE CoNFLIcr OF LAws 351 (1962).
100. Brainerd Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in
Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L REv. 1233, 1242, n.41 (1963).
1997] 357
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
should be addressed 101
The Restatement (Second) is a lengthy document organized
by subject matter: torts, contracts, property, trusts, status,
agency and partnerships, business corporations, and administra-
tion of estates. Each subject is further divided into sections deal-
ing with specific issues. For example, in the title on torts, there
are thirty sections dealing with matters such as personal inju-
ries, fraud and misrepresentation, defamation, legal cause, in-
tra-family immunity, damages, and vicarious liability. It has
been observed that "The substantive provisions of the Restate-
ment are a curious amalgam of the definite and the indefi-
nite!102 In those areas where the restaters thought that consen-
sus existed among the courts, they attempted to set forth
relatively precise and definitive rules.1°3 In other areas, the re-
staters set forth more flexible presumptions directing what law
should be chosen, unless rebutted. A typical example of the lat-
ter is section 146, which provides that:
In an action for personal injury, the local law of the state where the in-
jury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless,
with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more signifi-
cant relationship under the principles stated in section 6 to the occur-
rence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will
be applied.
Many sections in the second Restatement are stated this
way, creating a presumption in favor of choosing the local law of
this or that state unless, under the principles stated in section 6
(which are discussed below), some other state has a more signif-
icant relationship to the occurrence.
The concept of the most significant relationship is the core
of the second Restatement. It is repeated in section after section,
and constitutes the guiding principle of the second Restatement:
In a multi-state conflict of law, a court should choose the law of
the state that has the most significant relationship to the issue
in question. The determination of which state has the most sig-
nificant relationship to a particular issue is to be made accord-
ing to a number of factors, which in some sections of the second
Restatement are specified,104 while in other sections they are
101. See Kay, supra note 8, at 555-62.
102. WnInm RicHMAN & WniAm REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CoNucTS Op LAw 197
(2d ed. 1993).
103. Kay, supra note 8, at 552.
104. For example, section 148 specifies the following factors to determine the place
of the most significant relationship for fraud and misrepresentation:
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not.105 So, where the first Restatement focused on a single key
factor, the Restatement (Second) looks to a plurality of factors.1°6
The most significant relationship test is a direct descendant
of the so-called "center of gravity" or "grouping of contracts" ap-
proach, 07 which was developed and briefly used by the courts of
New York. 08 Although it has since been abandoned in that
state, four or five other states have taken it up, usually refer-
ring to it as the "significant contacts" approach.' °9 Under this
approach, a court makes choice of law decisions by looking to all
of the contacts that a case has with each state to determine
which state is the center of gravity of the matter in controversy.
Another way of putting this is to ask which state is the "most
intimately concerned" with the matter, or which state has the
"most significant contacts with the matter."10 By weighing a
plurality of factors rather than keying on only one, the grouping
of contracts approach liberated the choice of law process from
the shackles of the traditional approach. Unfortunately, while a
number of contacts may be taken into account, the contacts are
considered on a quantitative rather than qualitative basis. That
is, they are not evaluated to determine each state's interest in
having its law chosen. In fact, the contacts are rarely evaluated
on any basis whatsoever. They merely are counted up without
any consideration of their merit or worth,"' or at most with con-
clusory and arbitrary pronouncements concerning their relative
(a) the place, or places, where the plaintiff acted in reliance on the defendanVs
representations; (b) the place where the plaintiff received the representations;
(c) the place where the defendant made the representations; (d) the domicil,
residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the par-
ties; (e) the place where a tangible thing which is the subject of the transaction
between the parties was situated at the time; and (f) the place where the
plaintiff is to render performance under a contract which he has been induced
to enter by the false representations of the defendant.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 148 (1971).
105. Section 146 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND), quoted in the text immediately
above, is an example of a section that does not specify the factors to determine the place
of the most significant relationship.
106. See ROBERT A. SEDLER, ACROSS STATE LINES-APPLYNG THE CONFCT OF LAws
TO YOUR PRACTICE 34 (1989).
107. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 102, at 197.
108. See Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1954); Haag v. Barnes, 175 N.E.2d 441
(N.Y. 1961).
109. Professor Symeonides counts four states in tort cases and five in contract cases
that have adopted the significant contacts approach. Symeonides, supra note 5, at 199-
201.
110. Auten, 124 N.E.2d at 102.
111. See cases cited supra note 108.
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value 11 As a result, this approach devolves into little more than
"contact counting." It therefore does not provide rationality to
the choice of law process. In addition, the center of gravity or
significant contacts approach has proven to be highly manipula-
ble in the hands of judges, and produces decisions that are bla-
tantly inconsistent. 113
Although the most significant relationship test derives from
the grouping of contacts approach, it certainly was intended by
the drafters of the second Restatement to do much more than
merely count contacts. As exemplified by section 146, the signifi-
cance of a relationship is to be determined in accordance with
the principles stated in section 6 of the second Restatement.
Those principles are:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant
policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states
and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the par-
ticular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic pol-
icies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability
and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and applica-
tion of the law to be applied.11'
The second and third of those principles are derived from inter-
est analysis, and their inclusion in section 6 of the second Re-
statement incorporates interest analysis as part of the Restate-
ment's most significant relationship test. But only as a part. The
other principles in section 6 delve into matters that have noth-
112. See, eg., Lowe's North Wilkesboro Hardware, Inc. v. Fidelity Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 319 F2d 469 (4th Cir. 1963), where the court had to choose between North Carolina
law, under which negligent delay in acting on a life insurance application was actiona-
ble, and Pennsylvania law, under which it was not actionable. In deciding to choose
Pennsylvania law, the court proclaimed not only that the domiciles of both the applicant
and proposed insured was insignificant, but also that the place where the proposed in-
sured died was a circumstance "reduced almost to the point of irrelevancy" Id. at 474.
On the other hand, the court pronounced that the place of the insurance company's de-
lay was important. Continuing in the same vein, the court stated that the place where
the insurance application was executed "does not loom large" but the place where it was
sent is "important." Id.
113. For example, in Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1954) and Haag v. Barnes,
175 N.E.2d 441 (N.Y. 1961), the New York Court of Appeals reached blatantly inconsis-
tent results in determining the center of gravity of support agreements. Other illustra-
tions of the manipulability and inconsistency of the center of gravity or significant con-
tacts approach are not difficult to find. For instance, there is a group of usury cases in
which the Arkansas courts play havoc with a potpourri of contacts: Standard Leasing
Corp. v. Schmidt Aviation, Inc., 576 S.W2d 181 (Ark. 1979); McMillen v. Winona Nat'l &
Savings Bank, 648 S.W2d 460 (Ark. 1979); and Stacy v. St. Charles Custom Kitchens of
Memphis, Inc. 683 S.W.2d 225 (Ark. 1985).
114. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) oF THE CoNFuCT oF LAws, § 6 (1971).
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ing to do with interest analysis. Section 6 makes policy analysis
only one of a number of choice of law principles that should be
brought to bear in determining which state has the most signifi-
cant relationship to a particular matter.
Furthermore, many of the factors listed in various sections
of the second Restatement have nothing to do with interest anal-
ysis. The Restatement persists in counting contacts even though
they do not speak to a state's interest. So, we get a strange
brew of contact counting and interest analysis, topped off with
additional choice of law principles. While the second Restatement
incorporates interest analysis, it also looks to other considera-
tions that are completely irrelevant to the analysis of any inter-
est. In many respects the second Restatement is inconsistent
with interest analysis and in many cases will produce results at
variance with interest analysis. Insofar as the second Restate-
ment incorporates interest analysis, it brings rationality to the
choice of law process. On the other hand, insofar as the second
Restatement moves in a number of other directions, it subverts
rationality in the choice of law process.
B. The Beast in Action
Because the second Restatement tries to be so much and do
so much, it is rife with inconsistency, incongruence, and incoher-
ence.l'8 Given that it embraces such a wide variety of principles,
factors, and rules, it should come as no surprise that the courts'
application of it varies wildly."8 Some courts make a genuine ef-
fort to determine the place of the most significant relationship
by applying the principles of section 6 and following the rules or
presumptions set forth in the Restatement. Many courts, though,
do either one or the other.117 That is, some courts wield the Re-
statement's rules or presumptions with little or no consideration
of the principles in section 6; while other courts do exactly the
opposite by focusing predominantly on the principles of section 6
while minimizing or ignoring the rules and presumptions
throughout the rest of the Restatement."8 In applying section 6,
115. Prof Brilmayer provided a particularly apt metaphor. [t]he overall picture re-
minds one of the famous humorous definition of a camel; namely a horse drafted by a
committee. The [s]econd Restatement has something for everyone, but that is precisely
its problem. No matter what result you want to reach, the [s]econd Restatement provides
support BRILmAYER, supra note 20, at 75.
116. See Kay, supra note 8, at 558-62; Larry Kramer, Choice of Law In The Ameri-
can Courts In 1990, 39 AM. J. CoMP. L. 465, 487-89 (1991).




the courts usually evoke the second and third principles-that
is, interest analysis-to the exclusion of all the others. Indeed,
in the high majority of cases which evoke section 6, it has come
to stand for nothing more than interest analysis, as the other
choice of law principles contained in that section are rarely
utilized.
Some courts stress the policy-analysis aspect of the second
Restatement to such a degree that they transform the most sig-
nificant relationship test into something more akin to pure in-
terest analysis, making the remaining portions of the Restate-
ment superfluous. Professor Sedler notes that in determining
the state of the most significant relationship, many courts ig-
nore factual contacts while turning exclusively to policy analy-
sis.n 9 Indeed, in reading opinions purporting to follow the sec-
ond Restatement, one cannot help but be struck by how often the
courts shift into undiluted interest analysis.M° In many respects,
this development is salubrious, especially because it brings ra-
tionality and purposiveness to the choice of law process. On the
other hand, it is a disingenuous means to accomplish a worthy
end. A more unequivocal repudiation of the second Restatement
would be preferable.
Other courts convert the Restatement (Second) into some-
thing else that has little to do with policy analysis: the old
center of gravity or grouping of contacts approach. In these in-
stances, the courts make reference to the second Restatement,
perhaps coupled with a vague allusion to the place of the most
significant relationship, but then make little or no effort to ap-
ply section 6 or to follow any of the rules or presumptions in the
Restatement.121 Nor do these courts limit themselves to using the
particular contacts which are set forth in the Restatement to de-
termine the place of the most significant relationship. 22 Any
and all contacts will do for them, as they tote them up like
beads. In ignoring the Restatement standards, these courts actu-
ally are falling back to the old center of gravity approach, but
dressing it up in the terminology of the Restatement. 23 While
they speak in terms of a significant relationship rather than a
119. SEDLER, supra note 106, at 36.
120. See cases cited in SEDLEa, supra note 106, at 36, n.13. See also Transco Leas-
ing Corp. v. United States, 896 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1990); Vantassell-Matin v. Nelson, 741
ESupp. 698 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
121. See, ag., Burns v. Holiday Travels, Inc., 459 So. 2d 666 (La. 1984).
122. See, ag., Ashland Oil, Ina v. Miller Oil Purchasing Co., 678 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir.
1982).
123. See Kay, supra note 8, at 557.
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center of gravity or significant contacts, they overlook the Re-
statement criteria for ascertaining the place of the most signifi-
cant relationship, and therefore cannot be considered faithful to
the second Restatement.
On the other hand, several courts have explicitly stated that
the second Restatement calls for more than the mere contact
counting of the center of gravity approach. These courts em-
phasize that the significance of a contact must be determined by
policy analysis. The Supreme Court of Washington, for one, has
said that its practice under the second Restatement is not
merely to count contacts, but to determine the significance of
contacts in light of the interests of potentially concerned
states.'2 The court stressed that the general directive of section
6 calls for interest analysis, as do other more specific sections of
the Restatement.126
Finally there are the courts that have the most tenuous
grasp of the second Restatement and weakest commitment to it.
These courts seem to refer to the second Restatement almost as
an afterthought. For instance, in Cherry Creek Dodge, Inc. v.
Carter,27 the Supreme Court of Wyoming cited section 188 of
the second Restatement, but did so in connection with finding a
"reasonable forum relationship," which is a choice of law stan-
dard used in the Wyoming version of the Uniform Commercial
Code. Although this amounted to little more than a passing and
confused reference to the second Restatement, a federal court
later took it to mean that the Wyoming Supreme Court had
adopted the second Restatement.m Surely this is a most precari-
ous and tentative way to do so. Thus, even though Professor
Symeonides counts Wyoming as one of the states to adopt the
second Restatement in contract cases, he admits that Wyoming's
stance is open to substantial question.m
The second Restatement has added confusion and disarray
to the choice of law process. The havoc it has caused should not
be underestimated; as one observer frankly states, "one needs to
read a lot of opinions in a single sitting fully to appreciate just
how badly the second Restatement works in practice."130 Given
124. See cases cited Kay, supra note 8, at 559, n.241.
125. Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 555 P.2d 997, 1000-01 (Wash. 1976) (en banc).
126. Id. at 1001-02.
127. 733 R2d 1024 (Wyo. 1987).
128. Amoco Rocmount Co. v. Anschutz Corp., 7 E3d 909, 920 (10th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1112 (1994).
129. Symeonides, supra note 5, at 201, n.124.
130. Kramer, supra note 116, at 486-87.
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the dismal record of the second Restatement, there is little doubt
that the courts would do well to abandon it.
IV. THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY
As discussed previously, both the first and second Restate-
ment are fundamentally flawed. Neither of them is a sound
method by which to make choice of law decisions, and as a re-
sult they lead courts to make wrong choices of law. Still, propo-
nents of the first Restatement claim that it possesses the advan-
tages of certainty and predictability that are missing in interest
analysis. Even proponents of the second Restatement assert that
its rules provide a degree of certainty that is lacking in interest
analysis. Interest analysis is portrayed by its opponents as an
open-ended process prone to egregious manipulation in the
hands of judges.
Making comparative evaluations concerning the certainty
and predictability of legal methodology is a very unscientific
business. Any legal methodology is subject to manipulation, ei-
ther consciously or unconsciously, by judges, who, after all, are
prey to the sundry forms of human fallibility. Whether this
method or that is more susceptible to manipulation and uncer-
tainty is not something that can be precisely measured. None-
theless, critical examination of the various choice of law meth-
ods reveals that when it comes to manipulation and uncertainty,
it is the Restatements that are the real villains.
Indeed, the traditional approach of the first Restatement is
notoriously prone to manipulation. Its formal black letter rules
provide a facade of certainty that collapses upon the slightest
touch. By depending so heavily, as it does, upon how a case is
characterized--e.g., either as tort or contract, contract or prop-
erty, or will or estate--the traditional approach provides a good
deal of room for judges to manipulate choice of law decisions,
and they certainly have not shied from the opportunity to do so.
Formalistic rules like those of the first Restatement provide a
verbal stability to the law that is mere pretense, a sham.131
Under that cloak of stability, uncertainty, if not chaos, resides.
Moreover, because formal rules can never capture the com-
plexities or depth of the profuse situations they are meant to
govern, they have a tendency to multiply exponentially. Counter
rules are devised, and exceptions, then exceptions to the excep-
tions. As black letter rule is piled upon black letter rule, cer-
tainty and predictability wither chronically. Because the law
131. See JERom FRANK Couns ON TIAL 277-78 (1963).
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must deal with an abundance of complex and profound matters,
it turns out that hard-and-fast rules are rarely that. In reality,
a process-oriented approach (like interest analysis) provides
more real certainty and predictability than a rule-oriented
approach.
As far as certainty and predictability are concerned, the sec-
ond Restatement is not much of an improvement over the first.
Because its rules and presumptions are organized according to
subject matter, the second Restatement, like its precursor, oper-
ates through characterization, which is unfortunately conducive
to uncertainty. Whereas the first Restatement operated through
characterizing an entire case, the second Restatement operates
through characterization of separate issues. While the latter
surely is preferable to the former, neither of them is rational,
purposeful, or stable. In addition, a multi-factored approach like
the one set forth in the second Restatement obviously provides a
good deal of leeway for manipulating the various factors. In one
case, factor A is said to be important; in another, factor B. In
the bargain, certainty and predictability give way to vagary and
caprice. To make matters worse, by trying to be all things to all
people, the second Restatement contains far too much. Choice of
law principles, policy analysis, rules, presumptions, factors and
more factors all are encompassed in the second Restatement.
Hence, virtually anything can be done with it. In the hands of
one court, various section 6 principles reign supreme; in the
hands of another, policy analysis is the name of the game; in yet
another, contact counting predominates. In one case, a presump-
tion prevails; in another, it is overcome. Here, the most signifi-
cant relationship lies in state A; there, in state B. Thus, cer-
tainty and predictability under the second Restatement recede
ever further.
Admittedly, some uncertainty and manipulation also occurs
with interest analysis. As noted above, interest analysis is a
species of conventional legal interpretation, and as such it al-
lows judges a certain amount of discretion to make policy
choices. Unfortunately, judges have not always exercised that
discretion in a consistent, principled manner. On some occa-
sions, interest analysis has been mishandled in the courts, di-
minishing certainty and predictability of the law. Perhaps this is
because interest analysis is a difficult methodology to grasp, es-
pecially when it comes to matters such as unprovided-for cases
or comparative impairment. Despite these difficulties, however,
interest analysis has worked better in practice than either of
the Restatements. Its false starts, mistaken judgments, and
twists and turns are considerably less than those that have oc-
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curred under the traditional approach or the second
Restatement.
Interest analysis is no more open-ended than any other area
of legal interpretation. In any area of the common law or statu-
tory interpretation, judges are required to make policy decisions
or value judgments in order to bring purposiveness to the law.
Judging, after all, entails making judgments. This calls for some
degree of discretion, and in that respect interest analysis oper-
ates no differently than any other field of legal interpretation.
CONCLUSION
While interest analysis revolutionized how we think about
choice of law and undeniably has had a tremendous impact
upon the choice of law process, nonetheless the first and second
Restatement on the Conflict of Laws somehow retain their hold
on the courts. To this day, ten or twelve states stubbornly cling
to the first Restatement, despite its antiquated philosophy and
flagrant flaws. Meanwhile, the popularity of the second Restate-
ment in the courts continues to grow; it now has been adopted
by twenty or more states, notwithstanding its unruly dimen-
sions and demonstrable drawbacks. Perhaps it is the wide sweep
of the second Restatement that explains its appeal to the courts.
All things to all people, the second Restatement offers a smor-
gasbord of possibilities to judges. It can emphasize rules, factors,
or process; it can count contacts, analyze interests, or apply
principles. Indeed, to claim that a certain number of states have
adopted the second Restatement is, in a sense, misleading. Given
the different versions of the second Restatement that prevail in
various states, it probably is more accurate to say that some
states have adopted the contact-counting version of the second
Restatement, others the interest-analysis version, and so on and
so on. In addition, it may be even more accurate to point out
that a number of courts which profess to have adopted the sec-
ond Restatement are not particularly faithful to its dictates.
They pick and choose from one section or another, while ignor-
ing important parts of the document. In many states, while the
courts purport to adopt the second Restatement, they actually
practice something quite different. A number of those courts
transform the second Restatement into something closely akin to
undiluted interest analysis. While this is a significant step in
the right direction, a more straightforward conversion to inter-
est analysis would be much better.
It is undeniable that interest analysis has had a substantial
influence upon the second Restatement, and indeed upon the en-
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tire choice of law process. Still, far too few states have seen
their way to adopting pure interest analysis to make choice of
law decisions. The persistent attraction of the courts to the Re-
statement, either first or second, is a sorry state of affairs that
ought to be abandoned as soon as possible in favor of pure inter-
est analysis. After all, interest analysis has brought choice of
law thinking into the twentieth century, aligning it with modern
legal interpretation. It has brought reason, rationality, and pur-
posiveness to the choice of law process. When all is said and
done, it is interest analysis that provides the courts with a sen-
sible as well as sensitive process for making choice of law deci-
sions in a way that effectively accomplishes state policy. -The
structure of interest analysis articulated by Professor Currie re-
mains to this day a viable, teleologic method for making choice
of law decisions. Further refinements to interest analysis have
worked out some of the original kinks of Currie's system. The
apparent conflict concept and the comparative impairment con-
cept are welcome improvements that bring further rationality to
the resolution of conflicts of law. Another improvement is the
recognition that unprovided-for cases really are not unprovided-
for, and can be rationally resolved. Thus, interest analysis now
stands as a comprehensive system for making choice of law deci-
sions in a sound, rational manner. It is a shame that some
courts have never embraced that system and that others have
let it slip from their grasp.
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